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The Seabrook nuclear power plant construction project
disaster. It simultaneously threatens

its

is

an unqualified financial

chief owner, the Public Service Co. of New

Hampshire (PSNH) with bankruptcy and the company's electricity customers with huge
rate increases. The fifteen-year history of the project is reviewed to identify "what went
wrong?"
The review suggests that the basic problem has been mismanagement by both PSNH
and by government regulators. A three-year regulatory imbroglio over the environmental effects of the plant's cooling system was extremely costly in the mid-1970s.
By the time this problem was belatedly resolved, the project had begun to outstrip
the financial resources of its owners. These resources were seriously weakened by a
political battle over how to pay for construction costs.
By the end of the 1970s, the risks of proceeding with Seabrook were beginning to
exceed the benefits. PSNH management, however, chose to accept these risks, in effect
betting their company that the project could be completed.
Underlying many of Seabrook' s problems are certain federal nuclear regulatory policies and practices whose roots go all the way back to the Eisenhower administration.

These policies are also briefly reviewed.

Ten years ago nuclear power was advertised
to deal with

OPEC

and rising

oil prices.

as an important part of

America's strategy

Today, however, many Americans face the

prospect of huge increases, not decreases, in their electricity bills as

new

nuclear power

Americans have seen the value of their investthe stocks and bonds of electric power companies that are building nuclear

plants are brought into service. Other

ments

in

power

plants shrink to a small fraction of their previous value. In

customers of the Public Service

Company

of

New Hampshire (PSNH)

group and the company's creditors and shareholders are

problems

is

the Seabrook project. Seabrook

is

in the latter.

is

tain

C.

Bupp

electric

PSNH

power

these

PSNH

stands as

with bankruptcy

costs.

and federal and

shows

led to this catastrophe. 1 This review

is

The cause of

reviews the fifteen-year history of Seabrook, highlighting cer-

key actions and the decisions of both

ities that

/.

article

are in the former

PSNH. Today, Seabrook

an unqualified financial catastrophe, simultaneously threatening

and the company's customers with staggering

England, the

a partially built, 2,300,000 kilowatt

nuclear generating station whose principal owner

The following

New

that there is

state regulatory author-

no simple answer

to

Director of Utilities and Energy Management Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Cambridge

Massachusetts.

,

"what went wrong?" But it also suggests that a large part of the answer is
captured by a simple concept: mismanagement. Both PSNH executives and regulators at
times failed to do their jobs efficiently and effectively. Government agency policy shifts
the question

hindered the project's early years. Although

some

early errors in

years. Since at least 1980, Seabrook's

now

PSNH management

may,

judgement, their truly costly decisions were made

too,

have made

in the last four

owners have had clear warnings of the financial

happening. Unlike the owners of other partially built nuclear power

disaster that

is

plants, they

have not responded

to these

warnings by abandoning the project

in

order to

lessen the impact of the ensuing financial damage.

Nuclear Power

As

in

New England

a preliminary to a discussion of Seabrook,

about nuclear power in

New

England

some general background information
61

will be helpful.

Nearly three-quarters of the nuclear power plants that are currently operating

in the

United States were ordered before the 1970s. The majority of these plants were ordered
during the heady years of unalloyed optimism about nuclear power, between 1965 and
1968. 2 Although there were already some apparently unsettled questions about the

power plants, these questions came from persons or
organizations that at the time seemed to hold opinions contrary to technical and economic "facts." These facts were essentially unanimously agreed upon within the contemporary business and government establishment; accordingly, America's leaders,
indeed the world's leaders, fully concurred that nuclear power was both cheap and safe.
Incorporated in 1926 as a consolidation of several smaller power and light compa-

potential dangers of large nuclear

nies,

PSNH,

utilities to

over the following years, acquired about twenty additional small electric

become

the largest utility in

New

Hampshire, serving the needs of a growing

number of customers. In the late 1960s very high population growth was forecasted for
New Hampshire during the 1970s and 1980s, thus increasing electric power needs.
Most estimates indicated 3.5 to 4.0 percent annual growth rates accompanied by correspondingly high demands for electricity. PSNH staff members were predicting electricity demand growth of 7 percent throughout the 1970s and few, if any, informed
persons would have quarreled with them. 3

PSNH's
isfactory.
it

prior experience with nuclear power, while limited,

Moreover, given the concurrence

was not surprising

that nuclear

at the

had been extremely

time over relative safety and expense,

power came under consideration

as a possible solution

PSNH

to these potential rising

demands

management

"go nuclear" was neither surprising nor controversial. In the

late

in

1969

to

1950s, a consortium of

New

for electricity.

England

Hence, the

utilities,

sat-

initial

decision by

with financial help from the United

Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), built a pioneer nuclear power plant. The
Yankee plant, a 188,000 kilowatt facility located in western Massachusetts, began operStates

PSNH owned 7 percompany owned 4 percent of Connecticut Yankee, a

ating in 1960 and subsequently proved to be remarkably reliable.

cent of Yankee. In addition, the

565,000 kilowatt nuclear power plant also

built

with United States government aid.

Connecticut Yankee became operative in 1967 and also had a good performance record.

Both Yankee plants were tremendous bargains for PSNH. For an investment of only
about $10 million, the company
generating capacity.

owned approximately 100,000

kilowatts of reliable
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management of PSNH decided to build a nuclear generating facility at
Newington, near Portsmouth. However, the USAEC rejected the company's application
for a construction permit on the grounds that the proposed site was too close to Pease
Air Force Base. The USAEC ruled that the risk of a B-52 bomber, which carried
nuclear bombs, accidently crashing into the generating plant was unacceptably high.
The agency prohibited PSNH from building a nuclear power plant within a ten-mile
In 1969 the

radius of Pease, thereby eliminating several alternative sites that had been selected by

An

two years and culminated in 1972. A site was chosen several miles from the town of Seabrook on New
Hampshire's eighteen-mile Atlantic coastline. Four reasons were given for selecting
Seabrook: the ocean was a convenient source of cooling water for the power plant; the
site was accessible by barge, which would help minimize construction costs; the site
company.

the

62

was reasonably

extensive search for an acceptable

close to the

company's major

site lasted

electricity

demand

centers;

and the

site

offered a stable granite foundation.

PSNH

awarded an $80 million contract

watt nuclear steam supply systems.

to

Westinghouse

Company

to build

two 1,150,000

spokespersons said that the

first

kilo-

of the

would be completed by 1979 and the second by 1981. The Seabrook Nuclear
Station would supply 70 percent of New Hampshire's electric power needs during the

two

units

early 1980s at a cost estimated to be 60 percent cheaper than oil and 30 percent cheaper

than coal. These plans were presented to a Seabrook town meeting and were met with

an enthusiastic response as the town selectmen noted the significant revenue benefits to

community. Those at the town meeting unanimously approved the PSNH plan.
The 1972 population of Seabrook was about five thousand during the winter, when
was chiefly a fishing port, and about six thousand in the summer, due to tourism.

the

it

Behind the town's rather rocky beaches were
a habitat for a variety of marine

life

salt

marshes and

tidal estuaries serving as

and birds.

During the months following the plan's approval, however, local opposition

to the

Seabrook nuclear power plant began to develop among a diverse assortment of groups.
Numerous questions such as the following were raised: Would the nuclear plant hurt the
town's tourist business? Would it promote further industrialization of the scenic New

Hampshire coastline? Was the plant being built too close to an old earthquake fault?
Was the electricity from the plant really necessary? One question, however, soon
stood out as an especially troublesome one for PSNH. What would be the effects of the
plant's "cooling water" discharge on the local marine ecology?

The Cooling Tunnel Imbroglio
After pressurized steam passes through the power-producing turbines of any steam-

driven electrical generating plant, that steam must be condensed into liquid before

be sent back to the plant's boiler.

—must be
PSNH

available to absorb

had two alternatives

densing the steam, the

now

form as the

some of
air later

would contain

this

"heat sink"

its

warm ocean

in practice, relatively cool

water

cooling water could be sprayed into

heat would, in turn, be dissipated into the

water would evaporate into the heated

cooled. Because the plant was

salt that

—

can

enough heat from the steam to condense it.
in solving Seabrook 's "heat sink" problem. After con-

relatively

500-foot cooling towers where
ever, since

Some

it

threatened to

harm

a mist of rain

Howwould

so close to the ocean, this rain

the environment.

determined that cooling towers were not acceptable

air,

air.

at the

Because of

Seabrook

site.

this, the

AEC

This decision

PSNH

would have to use the ocean as the heat sink for its nuclear power
plant. The company's plan called for the construction of two 19-foot-diameter tunnels,
each running 1.5 miles into the ocean. One tunnel would draw in more than one billion
gallons of water per day and the other would discharge an equal volume, at a temperature about forty degrees warmer than the intake stream.
In early 1975 the Seacoast Antipollution League argued against the cooling tunnel
plan in hearings before John McGlennon, the regional administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The League's witnesses contended that
the discharge of hot water into the ocean would endanger shellfish and other marine life.
meant

that

Witnesses for

PSNH

disagreed. In June 1975

AEC's

plan. Thirteen

months

(NRC), issued

a construction permit for the

site.

later, the

McGlennon approved

the cooling tunnel

successor, the Nuclear Regulatory

Seabrook

facility

Commission

and work began

at the

But the Seacoast Antipollution League and others who opposed the plant refused

give up. They appealed to

McGlennon

to reverse his initial decision

and

in

to

November

would cause unacceptable damage to the local marine environment. This decision about the cooling tunnels meant that
the NRC was obliged to rescind Seabrook's construction permit, which it did on January 21, 1977. Four days later, however, the NRC suspended its own order, stating that
the matter raised complex legal and policy questions that had ramifications for other
nuclear construction projects. However, after subsequent public hearings, and about a
month of deliberation, the NRC again canceled Seabrook's construction permit and
ruled that PSNH would have to get the approval of the EPA director for the cooling
tunnels in order to regain its permit to resume construction.
1976 he did so, on the grounds

In June 1977

EPA

that the cooling tunnels

Director Douglas Costle overturned his regional administrator's

decision, determining that the tunnels were environmentally sound after

all.

new

This

way for construction to restart on August 1 The Seacoast AntiLeague took Costle 's decision to the federal courts. In October 1977 the
United States Court of Appeals in Boston denied the League's petition for a stay.
Meanwhile, the NRC reversed its 1972 position on cooling towers, saying that this al-

decision cleared the

.

pollution

was now acceptable if the EPA decided that they were necessary.
But the Seacoast Antipollution League had not exhausted its rights in court. The Court
of Appeals decision was successfully appealed to the United States First Circuit Court.

ternative to tunnels

In February 1978 the Circuit Court overturned Costle, holding that he

had based

his

decision on evidence presented outside the record, and hence unavailable to the environmentalists for cross-examination.
for reconsideration.

The

entire matter

was

sent back to the

EPA

Yet again, the Seacoast Antipollution League asked the

directors

NRC

to

withdraw Seabrook's permits, and on July 21, 1978, the NRC obliged. Two weeks later,
Costle again found the cooling tunnels to be environmentally sound, and on August 10,
1978, work resumed on Seabrook for the third time in a
In effect, the imbroglio over the cooling tunnels
for three years

—from June 1975

to

little

over two years.

had paralyzed the Seabrook project

August 1978. The delay was

originally supposed to cost approximately

$900

million.

PSNH's

costly:

Seabrook was

share of approximately

$450 million, reflecting its 50 percent ownership of the project, though large relative to
the company's financial resources, was well within its means. Yet during the period of
delay caused by the regulatory impasse, Seabrook's estimated cost rose alarmingly,
reaching some $2 billion during 1976. The project's critics began to focus on costs and
found a receptive public

in

New

Hampshire.
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The New Hampshire Public

Utility

Commission (PUC) was allowing

include a portion of Seabrook's construction costs

PSNH

to

in its rate base, thereby significantly

company. In May 1977 the commission granted
increase, half of which was attributed to Seabrook. The result

lightening the financial burden on the

PSNH

a 20 percent rate

of the increase was a sharp public outcry. In response, the state legislature passed a
prohibiting Construction
shire.

Work

in Progress

(CWIP)

Governor Meldrim Thomson vetoed the

bill

for retail

and

in the

power

bill

New Hamp-

sales in

1978 gubernatorial cam-

Hugh Gallen, made CWIP for PSNH a major issue.
Vote Gallen. Gallen was elected, and
Bumper stickers proclaimed: Whip CWIP
shortly thereafter he signed new anti-CWIP legislation. By the spring of 1979, PSNH
management had evidently decided that without CWIP the company could no longer
paign, Thomson's opponent,

support
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its

—

50 percent share of Seabrook. In March a spokesman announced

company would try to reduce its ownership by at least 20 percent. He
that the project was now estimated to cost $2.6 billion. Seabrook was

also

that the

announced

clearly already in

deep trouble.

One

of Seabrook's problems was the real technical uncertainty about the precise

effects of

potential

warm

water from the tunnels on local marine

life.

Moreover, these effects had

commercial significance on local industry. Of course,

McGlennon,

who had

a lawyer

political considerations.

It is

Both men may have played
political ends.

The key

made

frank political ambitions,

also possible that his boss, Costle,

"fast

point,

and loose" with

however,

is

scientific data

that the range of

honestly trying to

make

is

it

the

equally possible that both

possible that John

decisions motivated by

was

similarly motivated.

and opinion

disagreement

on the basic technical issue of cooling towers was wide enough
policy conclusions. Hence,

it is

to serve

among

experts

to sustain contradictory

McGlennon and

most responsible decision they could

Costle were

in the face

of technical

uncertainty. Indeed, throughout the thirty-year fight over nuclear power, such behavior

by public

officials has

been the

The February 1978 United
important feature of the
cal uncertainty.

The

way

rule, not the exception.

States Court of Appeals decision illustrates another

the administrative and legal system has dealt with techni-

was

court's decision

issues. This situation

is

entirely based

on procedural, not substantive,

also typical of nuclear safety and environmental litigation. 4

The

courts are extremely reluctant to second-guess the technical judgements of administrative agencies like the

EPA

or

NRC.

In 1978 the Court of

question of whether tunnels were acceptable.
propriate procedures for reaching his

own

It

Appeals did not rule on the

merely ruled that Costle had used inap-

decision.

The Three Mile Island Accident Aftermath
In

March 1979

the prospects for selling 30 percent of

Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric

Seabrook seemed

Company (MMWEC),

power companies, offered

bright.

The

a consortium of

buy 14 percent, bringing its
total ownership up to 20 percent. Several other small out-of-state utility companies
expressed interest in shares totaling about 8 percent. New Hampshire wholesale utility
companies were also potential buyers. Then came the accident at Three Mile Island
(TMI) nuclear power plant, which began on March 29. In its aftermath, outside interest
in purchasing part of Seabrook rapidly died down. In October
executives
notified PSNH management that their consortium would only be able to increase its
ownership by a maximum of 6 percent. The PUC barred PSNH from selling shares to
thirty-one small municipal

to

MMWEC

New

Hampshire wholesale

utilities

and ordered the company to retain

percent interest in Seabrook. In November,
realistic

PSNH

still

at least a

28

held 35 percent and had few

prospects for further sales. Part of the problem was that United Illuminating

Company of Connecticut, Seabrook' s second largest owner, was trying to sell half of its
own 20 percent share. In March 1980 PSNH raised the cost estimate for Seabrook to
$3.2 billion, attributing much of the increase to design changes needed to comply with
findings of the government commissions that had investigated the

TMI

accident.

By 1980 the financial implications of Seabrook had become potentially catastrophic
for PSNH. To understand how grave the situation had become, consider the approximate and simplified 1980 income data for
Table

PSNH shown

in

Table

1.

1
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Approximate Income Data, PSNH, 1980
(in

millions)

$
351

Revenues
Fuel and Other Operating
Expenses
Net Taxes

$

- 248
- 38
- 17

Depreciation

Operating Income

48

- 62

Interest

Allowance

for

Funds Used

During Construction

(AFUD):

72

Other Income

2

Other Net Income
Total Net
Source:

The

Income (earnings)

PSNH Annual

critical

item

Construction

Most
tions

60

Report, 1980

is

the

(AFUDC)

$72 million addition labeled Allowance for Funds Used During
to the category of operating

income.

state public utility regulatory authorities forbid

companies under

from earning a return on plant and equipment unless the

useful"
ities

12

—

that

is,

operating.

would over-invest

The

in plant

basic rationale

and equipment

is

that without

their jurisdic-

facilities are

"used and

such a prohibition

to the benefit of shareholders

util-

and the

detriment of customers. The "used and useful" concept has deep roots in United States
regulatory policy, going back to the

first

attempts to regulate railroads in the nineteenth

The 1977-78 fight between the New Hampshire Legislature and Governor
Thomson was only a recent battle in a war that has raged in American politics for more
than a century. The war continues today.
Over the decades, however, the utilities have consolidated an important victory.
While they are not typically permitted to include CWIP (or at least most of CWIP) in
century.

their rate bases, they are

PSNH

added

investors

to

its

allowed to report a noncash addition to their incomes. In 1980

reported earnings an amount equal to the hypothetical return that

would have received on

the funds invested in

CWIP

if

its

the assets represented

New England Journal

by

CWIP

of Public Policy

had actually produced revenues during 1980. This noncash credit

pany's income statement
its

Winter! Spring 1985

is

balanced by a corresponding debit to the

CWIP

to the

com-

account on

balance sheet. 5

The key
pany.

It is

point

is

that

PSNH's $72

was not a cash inflow

million addition

analogous to the $17 million

in reported depreciation

expenses.

to the

com-

PSNH neiAFUDC. It

ther paid out $17 million in cash on depreciation nor took in $72 million as

important to note that this $72 million was more than 90 percent of the company's

is

total

reported earnings.

PSNH's cash

earnings for 1980 were $23 million ($78 million plus $17 million

minus $72 million). Yet in the same year the company paid $13 million in preferred
stock dividends and $35 million in common stock dividends. These payments of $48
million certainly did represent a real cash outflow.

66

On

PSNH

top of this,

spent $161

million in capital markets. Table 2 summarizes the results:

Table 2

Cash Flows, PSNH, 1980
fin

millions)

$
60

Net Income

Cash Income

5

- 48

Dividends

Sub

Total

(43)

- 233

Construction Costs
External Financing

Sub

200

Total

Decrease
Source:

$

in

(33)

Working Capital

PSNH Annual

(76)

Report, 1980

By 1980 PSNH management was liquidating their company in order to finish Seabrook. By doing so they were taking an appalling risk, for they were effectively betting
their company that the project would be finished at approximately the cost and schedule
then estimated. Yet all past evidence clearly pointed to the near inevitability of further

The point of no

was rapidly approaching.
In 1980 PSNH's "writing off" of the sunk costs of Seabrook would have been financially painful but hardly fatal. At worst, common stock dividends would have been
foregone for some period. But as the cost of the company's investment grew during the
coming years, as management should have known it would, the threat of failure to ever
finish Seabrook would become an increasingly mortal blow for PSNH as a going busi-

cost increases and delays.

return

ness concern.

The Financial Fiascoes of

the 1980s

During 1981 and 1982, management's liquidation of
had a cash

deficit of

more than $35

million, yet paid

PSNH

accelerated. In 1982

common and

of $75 million. The project's costs had, predictably, continued to
billion

by the end of 1981.

On

January 12, 1982, the

PSNH

preferred dividends

rise,

reaching $3.6

New Hampshire PUC

ordered

PSNH

to sell

its

4 percent share

in the partially built

Connecticut and gave the company six

PUC

months

to

Millstone 3 nuclear power plant in

lower

its

Seabrook stake

to

28 per-

would order cancellation of unit #2. Three days later,
PSNH's bond and preferred stock ratings fell "below investment grade," an ignominy
shared at the time by only two other utilities: General Public Utilities (GPU), the owner

cent; otherwise,

said,

it

PSNH's

of TMI, and United Illuminating,

PUC

the

by

ordered an immediate halt to construction work on unit #2.

taking the

commission

PUC

turned the
at a

largest partner in Seabrook.

reduced

order.

PSNH

responded

December 1982, and the state supreme court overpromptly announced that work on unit #2 would continue
were now estimated

rate, but that total project costs

At the end of 1982

January 18

to court in

PSNH

mainly because of added

On

interest charges.

PSNH

estimated

to be

$5.25 billion,

6

its

future construction expenditures as follows:

67
1983: $255 million

1984: $185 million
1985: $135 million
1986: $120 million
1987:

$40 million

PSNH now

was probably beyond

more than two-thirds completed and
1983, the Connecticut

Powerlight

on

unit

nitely";

PUC

the point of

#2

unit

no return, with unit #1 standing no

less than one-quarter finished. In

ordered the state's two Seabrook owners (Connecticut

Company and United

Illuminating

Company)

to stop all

payments for work

#2. In September 1983, PSNH halted all construction work on unit #2 "indefiand in March 1984 United Engineers and Constructors, the architectural engi-

neering firm in charge of building Seabrook, informed

two

August

units

would be $10.1

that the total cost of the

billion.

In a subsequent public statement,
that the total project cost

PSNH

PSNH

"rejected" the $10.1 billion figure, claiming

would not exceed $6.9

billion. Shortly thereafter,

owners

accounting for 59 percent of Seabrook voted to cancel unit #2. The project's joint owners'

agreement, however, gave

PSNH

veto power over this decision, which the com-

pany's management promptly exercised. Then, two weeks

later, in

April 1984,

PSNH

management acted on their own initiative under the terms of the joint owners' agreement and ordered all work indefinitely halted on unit #1. Meanwhile, a management
consulting firm that had been retained by the Massachusetts Attorney General testified

before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities

case" additional cost to complete unit
figure, the firm testified,

years from the time

was $3

#1

billion,

(DPU)

that a

alone was $2.5 billion.

completion to take

A

at least

"minimum

best

more realistic
two and one-half

work resumed.

In 1972 when PSNH embarked on the Seabrook project, its debt and preferred stock
were rated a solid A, and the company was a healthy public utility in a high-growth
service territory. Thirteen years and more than $2 billion later, the company is stuck

with a 36 percent share of a half-built $5.25 billion project that threatens to cause bankruptcy unless

PSNH

it

is

finished and the

company's customers begin

to

pay for

debt and preferred stock threaten to run the firm into bankruptcy;

Meanwhile

it.

its

debt and

preferred stock were rated well below investment grade, and over 27 million

common

shares had been issued, constituting a dilution of several hundred percent. Dividend

payments on these shares have for several years been

classified as "return of capital."
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What Went Wrong
The roots of the Seabrook debacle go back to the very beginning of commercial nuclear
power in the United States; indeed, the seeds were planted nearly forty years ago. 7 In
1947 a new and uniquely powerful government agency was created and given full responsibility for developing the technology of atomic energy for both military and civilian purposes. For approximately the

first

ten years of

its

existence, however, the United

Atomic Energy Commission's top officials spent nearly all of their time and
nearly all of the agency's money on military nuclear programs. In part, this was the
unavoidable result of the magnitude of the task of building the stockpile of nuclear
weapons, which was regarded as the keystone of the nation's defense program during
States

the 1950s.

,~

Significantly, the

choice.

AEC's

military

was

tilt

also the result of a deliberate political

The agency's most powerful head during

the

Eisenhower administration, Lewis

Strauss, believed that the job of developing "atoms for peace"
sibility

was primarily

the respon-

of private industry. The technical and managerial resources of private industry

were, however, being similarly strained by the demands of military nuclear projects.

For instance, the

first

power-producing nuclear reactors were developed by private

industry for the United States

The

Navy

in

order to propel submarines.

two important
use by the Navy's

military origins of United States nuclear reactor technology had

consequences.

First, the reactors

themselves were designed for

highly trained and highly motivated operators but were not necessarily ideal for com-

mercial use by electric power industry personnel. The second consequence was that the

companies who developed and manufactured reactors for the United States Navy were,

on

quite understandably, eager to capitalize

more

lucrative civilian market.

By

their

knowledge and experience

in the

much

the early 1960s, the reactor manufacturers had modi-

fied the design of their naval reactors

and began

to aggressively

market

this

new, and

largely untested, product to their long-standing customers in the electric utility industry.

The nature of the commercial relationship between the reactor manufacturers and the
electric power companies is an important element in the story of United States nuclear
power. General manufacturers had provided technological leadership to the electric
industry for decades. Their customers respected

ity

ability to verify or

turer's

new

—and

them and

util-

substantially lacked the

even to question them on many technical matters. The manufac-

in reality, highly

novel

merely a relatively modest modification

—products were

to existing

generating technology. Nuclear power plants,

were simply a cheaper alternative

it

and well-understood

was

to heat water to

advertised and purchased as

clear,

electricity-

were not revolutionary; they

make steam-driven conventional

elec-

turbines.

tric

Moreover, the

made with

first

commercial sales of these nuclear steam supply systems were

prices guaranteed at levels that

tially sold at

made them

"loss leaders": merchandise ini-

or below cost in the expectation that a demonstration effect

would cause

additional customers to flock to the sales office and pay higher prices later on. This

marketing strategy was extremely successful.
first

loss leader sales, a

bandwagon market

United States, with electric
rush to

own

their industry's

utility

Meanwhile, the government agency

that

1966, less than three years after the

for reactors

executives

new symbol of

By
all

had developed across the

entire

but stumbling over one another in their

technological progress.

was supposed

to be in control, if not in

charge, of developing cheap, reliable, and safe civilian nuclear technology, was simply

a passive observer. During the crucial mid-1960s period of initial reactor commercialization, the

AEC's

activity in the

new

nuclear marketplace was essentially limited to

reprinting the manufacturers' advertisements under official covers, giving the reactors

was by no means the limit of the AEC's
leaders committed other errors both of omission and

the cachet of authoritative verification. But this
failure during the

mid-1960s.

Its

commission.
First, the

AEC

ulatory policy

was

simply never took the job of regulating nuclear power seriously. Regexplicitly

based on the peculiar proposition that because nuclear tech-

nology was so obviously hazardous, the companies manufacturing and purchasing

it

would regulate themselves. AEC officials assumed, in effect, that manufacturers would
design reactors that were "safe enough"; that construction companies would build them
according to rigid standards of quality control and quality assurance, and that

companies would operate them

The

safely.

AEC

defined

its

utility

job as setting the basic

design, construction, and operating standards and then "spot checking," with a strong

presumption that these standards were being followed, to make sure that designers,

and operators were doing what they were supposed

builders,

to do.

In the early years of nuclear power, the AEC's reactor program was also flawed by

an important error of commission.

Its scientific

research program

was almost

totally

concentrated on a single technical characteristic of nuclear power plant design: the

which reactors consumed uranium. What would turn out to be far more
commercially significant areas requiring research and development radioactive waste
efficiency with

—

disposal; safe, as distinct

of others

—were

from

fuel-efficient, design; simplicity of operation;

either ignored altogether or only

and a host

meagerly supported.

Signs of deep trouble quickly appeared in the United States commercial reactor mar-

By

was evident that some of the economic promises of the
early years were not being kept. Nuclear power plants were costing roughly double
what had been estimated to build them. The manufacturers responded with a design
change that it was hoped would make reactors cheaper: they started to sell much bigger
plants with the idea, borrowed from experience elsewhere, of spreading the high fixed
ketplace.

the late 1960s,

it

costs of plant construction across larger units of output.

were buying designs for nuclear plants

that

were up

By

the early 1970s, utilities

to six times larger than

any that had

yet operated. Today, most executives in the utility industry concede that the explosively

was a costly mistake.
A second and eventually more costly problem for the infant nuclear business came
from outside the closed circle of industry and government. Persons with no official connection to government regulators or industry buyers and sellers began to claim that,
contrary to the assertions of all of the latter, nuclear power plants were not safe enough.
An essential element of opposition to nuclear power in this country is often ignored.
Effective opposition has always been based on technical arguments. During the latter
years of the 1960s, outsiders began to ask specific technical questions about reactor
design and operating characteristics. And, from the first, they had the better of the argument over the questions they raised.
The watershed event was an eighteen-month public hearing held, at the insistence of
outsiders, by the AEC in 1972 and 1973. At issue was the adequacy of the "Emergency
Core Cooling System" (ECCS) for preventing a catastrophic accident to a pressurized
water reactor. After the hearing, which lasted 125 days, AEC regulations were revised,

rapid scale-up of designs fifteen years ago

vindicating the outsiders' claims that there were defects in the design of the reactors
that utilities

had rushed

to

buy during

the preceding ten years. Prior to the

ECCS

hear-
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power was limited to local challenges to specific projects.
became the inherent safety of the dozens of reactors then in oper-

ing, opposition to nuclear

Afterward, the issue

ation and under construction, and hence, the basic social acceptability of contemporary

nuclear power technology.

More

specifically, the

ECCS

signs of commercial nuclear
still

controversy caused the

power

of

many expensive

plants, each with the purpose of

safer. Currently, this process continues

of nuclear plants completed today

first

is

and

is

making

reactors

the basic reason that the average cost

higher than the average cost of plants completed in

the 1970s. United States nuclear power plants have been continually redesigned
effort to

make them comply with

rede-

in

an

established safety measures and developing safety

concerns. Each design change has increased the cost of the final product. Today, the

fundamental point of disagreement between the nuclear industry and

70

whether current designs and standards are "safe enough." There
the

argument

will

ating experience

be resolved for

is

at least several years, until

its

is little

outside critics

is

prospect that

considerably more oper-

gained with the redesigned plants, both here and abroad, that have

entered service only recently. But the weight of empirical evidence does

be accumulating on the side of those

who

insist that

now

appear to

today's designs are, indeed, safe

enough.
Ironically, perhaps the

most persuasive empirical evidence about the inherent safety

of today's reactor designs comes from the April 1979 accident

at

Three Mile Island. For

a large fraction of the American public, this accident seemed to be the definitive vindication of the claims of persons who had been fighting the nuclear industry. Something
that was supposed to be impossible, a catastrophic accident to a large, modern nuclear
power plant, had, apparently, almost happened. The nuclear industry's assurance that
TMI had proved that reactors were safe, not unsafe, had a decidedly hollow ring. Yet
the perspective of time and distance has added credibility to this assurance, for it is now

TMI confirmed some fundamental propositions about how nuclear reactors
would behave under extreme conditions that before the accident had only been proven
in theory. Nevertheless, it has also become increasingly clear that TMI was a true
watershed for nuclear power in the United States. All of the nuclear plants completed

clear that

and operating before the accident are now generating

electricity that is relatively cheap.

The TMI accident caused a virtual two-year hiatus in the licensing of new nuclear
power plants for operation. It also caused some costly design changes to plants that
were partially built at the time of the accident. The combination of the delays, during

a

period of unprecedentedly high interest rates, and the required design changes has meant
that nearly all plants

still

being built will produce relatively costly electricity. Many,

including Seabrook, will produce electricity that by any contemporary, reasonable stan-

dards

is

burning

By

extremely expensive: two or three times the cost of electricity produced from
oil,

the

unless oil-price increases exceed $75 per barrel. 8

end of 1980,

it

should have been evident to

PSNH management

that during

few years of operation, the plant would mean more, not less, expensive
electricity to its customers. It is true that 1980 was a year of deep pessimism among
nearly all energy experts about the probable cost of oil during the late 1980s and 1990s.
Seabrook 's

In

1980

lion,

it

first

was not necessarily

foolish to suppose that, even at a total cost of $5.25 bil-

Seabrook might produce relatively economical

that the price of oil

assuming

reached the levels of $100 per barrel that most experts were then

predicting. Yet the key point remains

company

electricity in the 1990s,

—PSNH management was

as a going business concern for arguable benefits.

literally risking their

Today Seabrook
most of

its

an unqualified catastrophe.

is

costs are passed along to

substantial annual rate increases
is

— 10

New
to

If unit

England

20 percent

#1

is

electricity

—

completed and

consumers

all

in the

or

form of

for several consecutive years, there

only a small chance that those costs will be offset by future benefits to different cus-

tomers. Moreover, there are several clearly more economic alternatives to Seabrook'

expensive electricity.
to

in the interests

It is still

of

PSNH

and the other owners' customers

abandon Seabrook. Unhappily, because of the investments made

in the project since

1980, Seabrook 's cancellation today, without substantial cost recovery from customers,

could

mean

the

end of

PSNH

as a going business concern

and the loss of hundreds of

The company's failure
the kind of company-

millions of dollars for the company's bondholders and creditors.
to cancel

Seabrook by 1981 was devastating:

wrecking mistake

that top

management has

it

was precisely

the ineluctable responsibility to avoid.

71

Notes
1.
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